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The Dragon in the Backyard: US 
Visions of China’s Relations toward 
Latin America
Detlef Nolte
The economic and political presence of China in Latin America has been growing since 
the turn of the century. China is now a major trade partner of Latin American countries. 
China is also a major investor in the region and quite recently also became an important 
lender as well as, in some cases, a major supplier of military equipment.
Analysis 
The United States has to react to the “dragon in the backyard” given that the Western 
Hemisphere has traditionally been a US zone of infl uence, and that Latin America is 
still a major US export market and destination of US investments. Since 2004–2005, 
politicians and think tanks have recurrently discussed the implications of the growing 
Chinese presence in Latin America for US interests and foreign policy. Neither the Bush 
administration nor the Obama administration saw/sees China as a major threat in Latin 
America. This was also the position of the majority of analysts linked to diﬀ erent US 
think tanks.  
  China’s interests in Latin America are mainly economic – namely, trade and access 
to natural resources.
  While some observers see a competition for scarce resources in Latin America, 
others emphasize the economic potentials and benefi ts of Chinese investments to 
explore new deposits in Latin America.
  The direct impact of Chinese economic links with Latin America is less important 
than its indirect impact: Latin American countries – including those with strained 
ties with the United States – can act more independently, consequently reducing the 
United States’ leverage to infl uence their policies.
  Until now, Chinese weapon sales to and military cooperation with Latin America 
have not been seen as a threat to US strategic interests. Only in extraordinary 
circumstances, such as a military confrontation in other world regions, would 
China’s presence in Latin America be seen as a direct threat to US security interests. 
Keywords: China, Latin America, United States 
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Opposite Approaches and Views in the United 
States
As Gonzalo Paz (2012: 20) emphasizes, perceived 
challenges to hegemonic power are almost as 
important as real ones. Essentially, there are two 
approaches that can be taken in order to respond to 
the rise of China (not only in Latin America), and 
both are linked to major international relations 
theories. One position starts from the assumption 
that a confl ict between the United States and China 
is inevitable and that the United States should be 
prepared to react in time. The counterposition 
is based on the assumption that confl ict can be 
avoided by integrating China into the framework 
of international institutions created by the West.   
In his theoretical framework of “oﬀ ensive re-
alism,” John Mearsheimer (2001; 2005) postulates 
that great powers strive for hegemony in their 
own region of reference. At the same time, they 
try to frustrate other great powers’ eﬀ orts to gain 
hegemony in their respective regions. Great pow-
ers do not like peer competitors; they prefer to en-
sure that several states compete for regional lead-
ership in other regions but not in their own. From 
a US point of view, it has been a great advantage 
that, in the past, no state in the Western Hemi-
sphere has posed a serious threat to US securi-
ty or survival. For this reason, the United States 
has been free to interfere in the backyards of oth-
er potential regional hegemonic powers. There-
fore, the United States suspects that emerging re-
gional powers could try to build beachheads in its 
own backyard. In this context, the growing eco-
nomic presence of China in Latin America is per-
ceived as a challenge to US security. This is espe-
cially the case with regard to the access to scarce 
raw materials, especially oil. On the other hand, 
there are suspicions that some Latin American 
countries, while playing the Chinese card, could 
take a more independent course in their relations 
with the United States. The Chinese presence in 
the Western Hemisphere is perceived as a sign of 
the erosion of both the power and the geopoliti-
cal position of the United States in the region. One 
should mention that oﬀ ensive realism is also quite 
infl uential among Chinese international relations 
scholars and their analysis of US policies (Nathan 
and Scobell 2012; Noesselt 2012). 
The counterposition is best represented by 
John Ikenberry (2008: 37): 
“The United States cannot thwart China’s rise, 
but it can help ensure that China’s power is ex-
ercised within the rules and institutions that 
the United States and its partners have crafted 
over the last century, rules and institutions that 
can protect the interests of all states in the more 
crowded world of the future.” 
This strategy was applied quite successfully by 
the Bush administration according to the former 
deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia 
and Pacifi c Aﬀ airs, Thomas J. Christensen (2009): 
“I would sum up Bush’s strategy toward China as 
a long-term eﬀ ort to shape the choices the leader-
ship in Beijing makes about how to use China’s in-
creasing regional and global infl uence.” Similar-
ly, Charles S. Shapiro, principal deputy assistant 
secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Aﬀ airs, said the following during a 2005 Senate 
hearing: “We encourage China to act as a stake-
holder in the international system of which it is 
a major benefi ciary. We support China’s engage-
ment in the region in ways that create prosperity 
and promote transparency, good governance, and 
respect for human rights.” 
Starting from these diverging positions with re-
gard to China’s growing presence in Latin Amer-
ica, the same events can be interpreted quite dif-
ferently. For example, the granting of an observ-
er status to China in the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank can be seen either as an indicator 
of waning US infl uence or as a strategy to inte-
grate China into institutions created by the Unit-
ed States a long time ago. The same is true with 
regard to participation of Chinese companies and 
investors in the development of the Panama Ca-
nal. In a 2005 Senate hearing, Rogelio Pardo-Mau-
rer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for West-
ern Hemisphere Aﬀ airs declared the following: 
“Now, China is one of the largest users of the 
canal and fast-growing. I think it is the third larg-
est user. So from what we can tell, it is in their in-
terest to have a canal that works and is depend-
able and is reliable. So to me the canal is actually a 
classic example of how bringing China in or help-
ing China become a responsible trading partner, 
a responsible member of the world trading com-
munity, is in our interest. […] It makes the canal 
something that they have an interest in cherish-
ing and defending. […] I am not sure I answered 
your question by saying that, but the short answer 
is that the most common concerns that I have seen 
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out there, that because a certain company that has 
Chinese investors, controls the terminal facilities 
of the canal, that, therefore, we need to be con-
cerned, that I think is not a concern.”
The same confl icting opinions on China’s pres-
ence in Latin America can also be seen with re-
gard to China’s acquisition of Latin American oil 
and participation in the exploration of new oil de-
posits in the region. On the one hand, a classic cri-
tique argues that “every barrel of oil China buys 
in the Americas means one less barrel of Western 
hemispheric oil available to the United States mar-
ket,” making the oil issue “a zero-sum game.”1 On 
the other hand, a more benign view of Chinese in-
vestment in oil exploration in Latin America con-
tends that2 
“if Washington takes a broad future-oriented 
perspective, we may be surprised at some of the 
common interests we share. That list of shared 
or broadly compatible interests, in my view, in-
cludes the following: One, if China invests in oil 
and energy resources in Latin America when oth-
ers are not prepared to do so, the PRC is contribut-
ing to a larger global pool of available energy. Lat-
in American oil brought to the surface by Chinese 
companies or fi rms or interests probably is going 
to end up in the United States.” 
This positive view of Chinese investment in 
natural resources is supported by empirical evi-
dence, which shows “that Chinese investment in 
Latin America predominantly expands and makes 
more competitive the global resource base. Chi-
nese investors tend to be more willing to take 
on new frontier projects that others pass up” 
(Kotschwar et al. 2012: 19).
While the United States tries to shape the behav-
ior of China, the behavior of the US government 
also infl uences China’s perceptions of the Unit-
ed States’ intentions. In the view of most US spe-
cialists, China implicitly recognizes Latin America 
as a US sphere of infl uence (Ellis 2012a; Paz 2012) 
and is keen not to produce suspicion in the United 
States with regard to Chinese motives and inten-
tions. Both governments are interested in avoid-
ing misunderstandings. With the visit of then US 
assistant secretary for Western Aﬀ airs, Thomas 
Shannon, to Beijing in April 2006, both sides start-
1 Gal Luft, the co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of 
Global Security during a US Senate hearing (2005).
2 David M. Lampton, director of the China Study Program at 
the Paul H. Nitz e School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns  Hopkins University, during a US Senate hearing (2005).
ed a dialogue on Latin America. The last round of 
dialogue took place in Washington in March 2012 
between then interim assistant secretary for West-
ern Hemisphere Aﬀ airs, Roberta S. Jacobson, and 
Chinese counterpart Yan Wanming. The sixth 
round of dialogue is being organized for the cur-
rent year; it will be the fi rst of the Xi Jinping ad-
ministration and the fi rst of Obama’s second term 
in oﬃ  ce (communication by Gonzalo Paz March 
7, 2013). There could be more cooperation in Latin 
America between the countries in the future. 
Some authors go so far as to speak about the 
possibility of a triangular relationship between 
the United States, China and Latin America (Arn-
son and Davidow 2011). However, this argu-
ment ignores the fact that there are more players 
with stakes in Latin America than only the Unit-
ed States and China. The European Union is still 
a major economic partner of Latin America, Rus-
sia is an important exporter of weapons to Latin 
America (especially to Venezuela) and Iran is a 
new actor in the region. There are also more Asian 
countries with strong trade links to Latin Ameri-
ca such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and, last but not 
least, India. Moreover, the argument incorrect-
ly transmits the view of Latin America as a uni-
tary actor. Likewise, it is not in the interest of Lat-
in American countries to focus their foreign poli-
cy only on China and the United States, or to sub-
stitute one hegemon with two hegemons.    
Two Cycles of Debate about China in Latin 
America
There have been two cycles of public and academ-
ic debate about China’s growing presence in Lat-
in America. The fi rst started in 2004–2005 with nu-
merous publications by US think tanks and aca-
demics as well as congressional hearings on the 
topic. In April and September 2005, both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate held hearings 
on China. The catalyst for the fi rst round of debate 
was two visits to Latin America by Chinese politi-
cians: President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day tour in 2001 
and President Hu Jintao’s visit to Argentina, Bra-
zil and Cuba following the Asia-Pacifi c Econom-
ic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Santiago, Chile 
in 2004. President Hu Jintao was seen to have out-
performed President Bush with his announce-
ment that China would invest 100 billion USD in 
Latin America over the next ten years. This state-
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ment earned the Chinese president much more 
press coverage in Latin America than President 
Bush, who also participated in the APEC summit 
in Chile. Moreover, China got observer status in 
the OAS in 2004.
The initial burst of interest in China’s presence 
in Latin American eventually subsided because 
the United States felt secure with regard to its own 
strength in Latin America. It was, after all, still the 
most important trade partner of Latin America, 
whereas Chinese investment in Latin America was 
quite small compared to that of the United States. 
For example, a 2008 study for the Committ ee on 
Foreign Relations of the US Senate states that
“after several years of increased Chinese en-
gagement with Latin America, most observers 
have concluded that China’s economic involve-
ment with the region has not posed a threat to 
U.S. policy or U.S. interests in the region. In terms 
of economic, political, and cultural linkages, the 
United States has remained predominant in the re-
gion. U.S. trade and investment in Latin America 
dwarfs that of China, while the future growth po-
tential of such Chinese economic linkages with the 
region is constrained by the advantages conferred 
by U.S. geographic proximity to Latin America” 
(Congressional Research Service 2008: 16). 
Nor did the US government perceive a military 
threat from China in 2004–2005 as Rogelio Pardo-
Maurer explained in a Senate hearing in 2005: 
“There is no evidence of Chinese interest in es-
tablishing a continuous military presence in the 
region, nor is there evidence that Chinese mili-
tary activities in the Western Hemisphere, includ-
ing arms sales, at this time pose a direct conven-
tional threat to the United States or its friends and 
allies.” 
In the future, however, there might be con-
cerns with regard “to rapidly advancing Chinese 
capabilities, particularly in the fi elds of intelli-
gence, communications, and cyber warfare, and 
their possible application in the region.” In gener-
al, there have been some concerns that China has 
been using surveillance facilities in Cuba to inter-
cept US radio and telephone transmissions and to 
practice cyber espionage. 
During the fi rst cycle of debate about China’s 
presence in Latin America, the “Taiwan factor” 
was an important topic given that (at that time) 
the region (including the Caribbean) contained 12 
of the 25 countries that maintained diplomatic re-
lations with Taiwan. Therefore, it was speculated 
that China would try to lure away Latin Ameri-
can countries and, as a result, negatively aﬀ ect 
Taiwan’s international status. This topic later re-
ceived less att ention in the United States because 
China only achieved some limited success – that 
is, Costa Rica ceased to recognize Taiwan – and al-
so suﬀ ered setbacks with regard to small Caribbe-
an islands. Today, 11 of the 23 countries that main-
tain diplomatic relations with Taiwan are still lo-
cated in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The second cycle of US concern regarding the 
“dragon in the backyard” started at the beginning 
of this decade. The US economy had been debil-
itated by the fi nancial crisis of 2007–2008, while 
Chinese trade with Latin America was still grow-
ing at high rates. Between 2000 and 2011, US par-
ticipation in Latin American exports and im-
ports went down from 59.7 percent to 39.6 per-
cent and from 50.4 percent to 30.1 percent, respec-
tively. During the same period, Chinese participa-
tion in Latin American exports and imports grew 
from 1.1 percent to 8.9 percent and 1.8 percent to 
13.8 percent, respectively. In Brazil (a key coun-
try), China overtook the United States as the most 
important trade partner. In 2011, China was the 
fi rst or second most important destination for ex-
ports in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries (CE-
PAL 2012). Moreover, trade with China was in-
creasingly supplemented by Chinese investment 
and Chinese credits. As Gallagher et al (2012: 
27) found, “China has committ ed approximately 
75 billion USD in loans to Latin American coun-
tries since 2005. China’s loan commitments of 37 
billion USD in 2010 were more than those of the 
World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the US Ex-Im Bank combined for that year.” 
In 2009, China also joined the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank. China lends money to countries 
such as Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, which 
have problems borrowing money in the global fi -
nancial market. Chinese banks do not att ach po-
litical conditionality to their loans. However, they 
do generally tie their loans to the purchase of Chi-
nese goods. Around two-thirds of Chinese loans 
combined a loan agreement with an oil sale agree-
ment (oil for loans). Chinese loans are also used 
for infrastructure projects.   
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Diﬀ erent Types of Challenges for the United 
States
Taking a broader look at the current perceptions 
of the challenges that China’s activities in Latin 
America present to US interests, one can diﬀ eren-
tiate between economic, military, and geopolitical 
challenges, on the one hand, and direct and indi-
rect challenges as well as normal challenges and 
challenges in extraordinary situations, on the oth-
er hand. However, in recent documents and dec-
larations, the US government’s reaction to China’s 
growing presence has generally been quite muted. 
In their Key Strategic Issue List for 2012/2013, 
the US Army War College lists fi ve issues for the 
Western Hemisphere (Strategic Studies Institute 
2012); one of which is the need to assess the strate-
gic implications of increased Chinese engagement 
in Latin America. In contrast, the 2012 and 2013 
briefi ngs of the Congressional Research Service 
on Key Issues for Congress in Latin America and 
the Caribbean do not mention China. Moreover, 
in an October 2011 hearing before the Committ ee 
on Foreign Aﬀ airs of the House of Representatives 
on Emerging Threats and Security in the Western 
Hemisphere, China was not a very prominent top-
ic – being mentioned only twice. Responding to 
one representative’s questions as to whether Chi-
na’s activities in the Western Hemisphere were 
considered a serious emerging threat, Philip Gold-
berg, head of the Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, answered that there were some economic 
challenges and some minor diplomatic challenges 
related to the fact that both China and Brazil are 
involved in the BRICS group. However, China’s 
weapon sales to the region are not seen as a major 
security problem. 
From a broader perspective, however, the de-
livery of Chinese military equipment to Latin 
America and Chinese-Latin American military 
cooperation are seen with mixed emotions. Chi-
na has increased personnel exchanges and insti-
tutional contacts with Latin American militaries 
and has participated with the military police in 
the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUS-
TAH) since 2004. Much more important from the 
US point of view are military sales to Latin Amer-
ica – starting with unsophisticated items such as 
personal equipment and military clothing, and 
moving up to more sophisticated military equip-
ment such as aircraft (fi ghters and transport) and 
radar and telecommunication systems (also for ci-
vilian use). China’s main clients have been Vene-
zuela, Ecuador and Bolivia (Ellis 2011a). 
On the one hand, China’s donations or sales of 
military equipment at relatively low prices were 
perceived as a contribution to the ability of poor 
governments in the region to assert control over 
national territory and to confront drug traﬃ  ck-
ing. On the other hand, the willingness of China 
to sell low-cost arms to countries in confl ict with 
the US, such as Venezuela, undercuts the ability 
of the United States to impose sanctions or con-
trols on the arms purchases of such countries (El-
lis 2011a, 2012). 
However, only in an extreme case of open hos-
tility between the United States and China would 
China’s military cooperation with and weapon 
sales to Latin America become a genuine securi-
ty threat to the United States. In such a context, 
China would be able to create diversionary crises 
or conduct disruption operations in close proxim-
ity to the United States – for example, by trying 
to close oﬀ  strategic choke points such as the Pan-
ama Canal (Ellis 2011a) or using the presence of 
Chinese logistic companies in major Latin Amer-
ican ports. But for the moment, as one specialist 
argues (Ellis 2011a: 9), “nothing in the public dis-
course of the Chinese leadership, policy papers, 
or debates suggests that Latin America is consid-
ered in the short term as a base for military oper-
ations.” Nevertheless, the US expectation is that 
“Chinese military engagement with Latin Amer-
ica is likely to be a growing and enduring part of 
the regional dynamic” (Ellis 2011a: 46).   
There are some minor concerns with regard 
to the expansion of ties between organized crime 
in China and Latin America, especially with re-
gard to traﬃ  cking (of humans, narcotics/precur-
sor chemicals, contraband and arms) and mon-
ey laundering (Ellis 2012b). But these develop-
ments are not blamed on the Chinese government. 
In general, US and Chinese cooperation in chemi-
cal control and counternarcotic operations is eval-
uated as positive. In a 2011 congressional hearing, 
Daniel L. Glaser, assistant secretary for Terrorist 
Financing at the Department of Treasury, denied 
there was any Chinese activity in the region that 
would raise illicit-fi nancing concerns and argued 
that cooperating with China will be part of the so-
lution for the problem (U.S. House of Representa-
tives 2011).    
There have also been criticisms that Washing-
ton has been overly complacent with regard to the 
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geoeconomic implications of China’s entrance in-
to the Americas and the loss of markets due to 
Chinese advances in trade and investment (Farn-
sworth 2012). However, other analysts see Chi-
nese investments in Latin America as having had 
a limited impact on US interests. Sullivan (2013), 
for instance, points out that the United States re-
mains the single largest trading partner for many 
Latin American countries and that US trade with 
the region (800 billion USD) was more than three 
times the amount of China’s in 2012. While the 
purchase of goods from China has, to some de-
gree, displaced Latin American purchases of prod-
ucts from US companies, Ellis (2012a: 5) makes the 
point that “in many cases US-registered compa-
nies actually produce part or all of their products 
in the PRC or they source components there, in-
creasing the competitiveness of those goods as 
they sell them to Latin America and other mar-
kets.”  
Nonetheless, deepening economic relations be-
tween China and Latin American countries may 
have an indirect, negative impact on US-Latin 
American relations (Ellis 2012a; Farnsworth 2012) 
by undermining the ability of the United States 
to pursue its agenda in the region. These grow-
ing relations with China send the signal to Latin 
American governments that economic develop-
ment can be achieved without adhering to West-
ern proscriptions. Regimes hostile to the United 
States can turn their backs on Western lending 
institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank. Thus, countries could side-
step the negative consequences of actions deemed 
hostile to the interests of the United States and US 
companies – for example, defaulting on loans or 
nationalizing industries, amongst other things.
Conclusions
While there are diﬀ erent interpretations of the 
implications of China’s growing presence in Lat-
in America, neither the Bush administration nor 
the Obama administration viewed/view China 
as a major threat in Latin America. This is a po-
sition shared by the majority of analysts linked to 
diﬀ erent US think tanks. The United States’ loss 
of trade shares and presence in Latin America is 
more a result of its own weakness and loss of ini-
tiative than of Chinese strength. It is also a result 
of a changing international economic order. In 
general, there is a prevailing sense of resignation 
with regard to China’s presence in Latin Ameri-
ca, which is well captured in a statement by Ste-
phen Johnson, an analyst from the conservative 
Heritage Foundation, in a 2005 US Senate hear-
ing: “In a globalized world, the Monroe Doctrine 
has declining relevance. Democracies have rela-
tions with whom they wish and nation compet-
itors like China cannot be blocked from visiting 
the hemisphere. However, the United States can 
be more proactive in consolidating relations with 
its neighbors and promoting a truly open, com-
petitive marketplace” (Johnson 2005). More re-
cently, R. Even Ellis (2012a: 13) of the Center for 
Hemispheric Defense Studies said that “the PRC’s 
economic presence in and political impact on Lat-
in America will continue. It will remain a perma-
nent fi xture of the hemisphere, alongside that of 
the European Union, India and a host of other ex-
tra-regional actors.”
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